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Toxic Assets: Untangling the Web 
Margarita S. Brose* & Bill Nichols 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The world has not been moving quickly enough to untangle the web 
of toxic assets that lie at the root of the recent global financial crisis, and 
society may be missing its chance to learn from its mistakes. The most 
important question regarding the collapse of the financial market system 
does not address how much money one is going to lose in the current 
financial crisis but rather what happened to cause the global predicament 
in the first place. In other words, the current focus on valuation is 
misplaced; the focus should instead be on the relationships that 
contributed to the meltdown. Those relationships were based on the 
expectations of purchasers and the ―guarantees‖ of sellers of the 
underlying securities, often with minimal supervision or forethought. 
Now is the time to identify who did what, when it happened, and where 
the relationships led. This shift in analytical focus can help build a 
detailed audit trail that shows what actually happened in the financial 
markets during the past five years. 
Most commentators agree that the collapse of the subprime mortgage 
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market was a major cause of the current crisis.1 Some of the same 
technological developments in business practices that enabled the system 
to spin out of control so quickly are also key components in building a 
fact base to describe the cause of the collapse. For example, the assets 
collateralizing asset-backed securities (ABSs)2 and other similar assets 
that originated in the now-collapsed housing market make up the bulk of 
so-called ―toxic assets‖ found in portfolios of troubled banks.3 These 
subprime mortgages, and the financial instruments created by them, 
leave a money trail that can help identify their owners and the practices 
that affect their markets.4 
These trails are not easy to follow. Specialized experts are required 
to untangle the web of relationships between those who created, sold, 
and bought the securities, which are complex because many of the same 
parties are often involved at multiple levels of the same underlying 
securities.5 However, through this process of untangling, one can 
uncover a definite set of facts to reveal what actually happened. Also, it 
becomes possible to initiate a discussion about the proper way to create a 
central repository of transactional history to help federal regulators 
manage risk in a way that is rooted in our financial system, rather than 
continuing merely to hypothesize about the crisis. 
After providing relevant background, this Article theorizes why the 
global financial system collapsed and proposes courses of action to 
further understand and prevent future problems. Using the knowledge 
gained by investigating the paper trails, future problems can be prevented 
by (1) documenting and demonstrating the types of financial engineering 
and preventing market practices that produced securities with obscure 
risk profiles and maturity mismatches; (2) encouraging companies to 
strengthen their back offices to help assess risk and avoid transactions 
that add more toxic assets to companies‘ portfolios; and (3) creating a 
system between the back offices and regulatory authorities to track 
 
 1. See generally JAMES R. BARTH, ET AL., THE RISE AND FALL OF THE U.S. MORTGAGE AND 
CREDIT MARKETS, A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET MELTDOWN (2009). 
 2. For a definition of asset-backed securities, see DWIGHT ASSET MGMT. CO., FIXED 
INCOME PRIMER: ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.dwight.com/pubs/dwightABS2005.pdf [hereinafter DWIGHT] (―Asset-backed securities 
are bonds or notes collateralized by the cash flows from a specified pool of underlying assets. These 
asset pools are comprised of receivables from any number of consumer asset types, including credit 
cards, auto loans, and home equity loans, as well as other nonconsumer asset types such as 
equipment leases and loans, utilities, aircraft leases, and royalties.‖). 
 3. Bryan R. Routledge & Stanley E. Zin, Model Uncertainty and Liquidity, 12 REV. ECON. 
DYNAMICS 543, 543–44 (2009). 
 4. See BARTH, supra note 1, at 16. 
 5. See LAURIE S. GOODMAN, ET AL., SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT DERIVATIVES 8 (2008). 
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transactional history that will help federal regulators foresee and manage 
possible risks rooted in our financial system and, thereby, help prevent 
future problems. 
II. A STARTING POINT: A BACKGROUND ON FINANCIAL MARKETS 
In order to understand and analyze the current market system, one 
must first make some preliminary observations about the contemporary 
financial markets, their recent evolution, and areas of activity. First, the 
increase in the number and complexity of tradable instruments, 
especially those related to structured securities, undoubtedly contributed 
to the market failure.6 The following developments made this expansion 
of tradable instruments possible: 
 Advances in financial techniques used to structure custom 
instruments;7 
 Development of a legal framework to support the requisite 
underwriting arrangements;8 
 Proliferation of hedge funds, many of which were set up 
primarily to invest in structured securities from the mortgage 
boom;9 and 
 A drive for market growth and increased profits from the 
largest global banking and financial institutions, leading to 
wider availability of securitized transactions and other 
relationships previously confined to a small inner circle of 
global banks.10 
Over the past five years, these developments were at the core of the 
business activities that generated wild volume growth in various types of 
securities, particularly Credit Default Swaps (CDSs).11 In addition to 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. BARTH, supra note 1. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 125–26. ―A credit default swap is a contract that provides insurance against the risk 
of a default by particular company. The buyer of the insurance obtains the right to sell a particular 
bond issued by the company for its par value when a credit event occurs. The bond is known as the 
reference obligation and the total par value of the bond that can be sold is known as the swap's 
notional principal. The buyer of the CDS makes periodic payments to the seller until the end of the 
life of the CDS or until a credit event occurs. A credit event usually requires a final accrual payment 
by the buyer. The swap is then settled by either physical delivery or in cash. If the terms of the swap 
require physical delivery, the swap buyer delivers the bonds to the seller in exchange for their par 
value.‖ JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVE SECURITIES 637 (5th ed. 2002). 
The ―standard‖ structure utilized in CDOs where the underlying assets consist of investment grade 
bonds (agency and prime) is referred to as the ―Six Pack.‖  This refers to six logical tranches 
grouped into three classes: Senior, Mezzanine, and Subordinate. In the case of the set of CDOs that 
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sheer volume growth, massive webs of relationships formed across asset 
classes and between participants who bought and sold securities based on 
subprime mortgages.12 These webs made it increasingly difficult to 
follow the money, as the quantity and complexity of financial 
relationships increased.13 Such complexities and increases in volume 
made it easier for a large number of high-risk transactions to go 
unmonitored or even completely unnoticed.14 
Second, the combination of the advanced securitization products 
such as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs),15 the nascent secondary 
Over-The-Counter (OTC)16 market for CDSs, and myriad new hedge 
funds created to take advantage of these and other facets of market 
evolution formed a classic ―feedback loop.‖17 The core of the process 
consists of a relatively small number of players, a finite amount of raw 
material to package, and a limit to the speed at which players can 
package that material for distribution.18 The tightly coupled nature of 
relationships between market players in the feedback loop (and their 
corresponding obligations), exacerbated by problems in recordkeeping, 
led directly to widespread fear that the house of cards was crashing.19 
This fear cascaded from one set of securitized products (ABSs and 
CDOs) to the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) market in a 
matter of days in 2008.20 The fear crushed the  economy by freezing cash 
flows because the banks at the center of everyday commerce had turned 
 
utilize subprime ABS as underlying collateral, the structure used is generally referred to as XS/OC 
(eXcess Spread/Over Capitalization), referring to the methods used to extract the premium 
associated with higher risk. 
 12. See JONATHAN CHENG ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, DEMYSTIFYING THE CREDIT 
CRUNCH: A PRIMER AND GLOSSARY 5 (2008). 
 13. Id. at 5–7. 
 14. Id. 
 15. ―A collateralized debt obligation is a way of packaging credit risk in much the same way 
as a collateralized mortgage obligation is a way of packaging prepayment risk. This involves 
creating four classes of securities, known as tranches, from a portfolio of corporate bonds or bank 
loans. The creator of the CDO normally retains tranche 1 and sells the remaining tranches in the 
market.8 A CDO provides a way of creating high-quality debt from average-quality (or even low 
quality) debt.‖ HULL, supra note 11, at 646–47. 
 16. ―The over-the-counter market is a telephone- and computer-linked network of dealers, 
who do not physically meet. Trades are done over the phone and are usually between two financial 
institutions or between a financial institution and one of its corporate clients.‖ Id. at 2. 
 17. See BARTH, supra note 1, at 13; Tyler Durden, The Negative Convexity of CDS Trading 
and Why CDOs Chase Markets, SEEKING ALPHA, Feb. 19, 2009, 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/121462-the-negative-convexity-of-cds-trading-and-why-cdos-chase-
markets. 
 18. See BARTH, supra note 1, at 5. 
 19. See CHENG, supra note 11, at 3. 
 20. Id. at 5. 
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the lending business into a manufacturing and packaging game.21 
Third, the products that prompted the credit freeze were the so-called 
―toxic assets‖ engendered by the subprime mortgage loan market. The 
facts regarding the way toxic assets came to destroy the market are 
undisputed: 
 The ABS market for subprime mortgage-backed securities 
grew from under 10% of all mortgages in 2000 to roughly 
25% in 2007;22 
 The significant drop in the quality of subprime mortgages 
beginning in late 2005—the subprime mortgages written in 
2006–07 are significantly more likely to default than earlier 
vintages of loans;23 
 The realization that significant numbers of new mortgages 
(and the securitized assets built on them) would not perform 
nearly as well as the models used to structure and value them 
predicted caused a collective panic in the trading and 
banking communities;24 
 Continual refinement of increasingly specialized asset 
classes from prior larger groupings, done in order to create 
specialized products, combined with a limited numbers of 
players in each sub-sector, led to a cascading seizure that 
started in long-term debt markets and moved rapidly into 
short-term money markets, thereby crippling the economy.25 
In short, the relationships among market participants trading CDSs 
and other products based on subprime securities served as the 
transmission mechanism to spread toxins throughout the system. 
Lastly, the widely held view that market participants would moderate 
their own behavior in order to protect their individual corporate viability 
obviated the need for an entity to oversee the overall system. With no 
central authority to report to, those who wanted to raise concerns 
regarding subprime securities market trading practices were unable to do 
so.26 Adding to the complexity of the problem was the increasing 
globalization of the financial services industry, accompanying decreases 
in transparency,27 and the corresponding tendency of firms to engage in 
 
 21. See BARTH, supra note 1, at 11–15. 
 22. Id. at 8. 
 23. Id. at 23. 
 24. See generally GOODMAN, supra note 5. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 316. 
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regulatory arbitrage.28 
III. THE PRODUCTS 
Products in the financial market contributed to the building 
complexity and lack of oversight preceding the market‘s deterioration, 
and therefore are integral to a discussion on the way to prevent  similar 
financial problems in the future. Relevant trends include the evolution 
and use of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default 
swaps (CDSs). 
A. Derivative Securities: Structured Products (CDOs) and Pure 
Derivatives (CDSs) 
Derivatives consist of two major categories: structured instruments 
that represent pieces of underlying assets and the classic ―pure 
derivatives,‖ including options,29 forwards,30 futures,31 and swaps.32 The 
evolution of the markets for structured debt products led to the 
emergence of a market for pure derivatives based on the credit risk that 
one of the parties in the deal may default on its payment terms, hence the 
name ―Credit Default‖ market, often referred to as the ―Credit Risk‖ 
market.33 
Structured products were generally developed with one of two goals 
in mind—either to raise capital (especially for corporations) or to free up 
room on the balance sheets of lending firms.34 The layers of relationships 
and corresponding obligations (debts or potential debts) created a house 
of cards tied together with an increasingly complex series of links 
between the instruments and participants. This uncertainty was 
compounded by a lack of investment in the back office, where the 
physical processing of transactions takes place.35 With the attitude that 
―traders and deals make money, everyone else is just a parasite,‖ 
companies often made short-sighted investments by outsourcing staff and 
 
 28. See generally GOODMAN, supra note 5. 
 29. Options allow one to pay for the ability, though not the requirement, to buy or sell 
something in the future at a price determined today. Id. at 6. 
 30. Forwards allow one to lock in a future price without having to pay for the privilege, but 
one is committed to the deal—there is no option not to transact at the given date. Id. at 2. 
 31. A future is a form of standardized forward that trades on an exchange. Id. at 5. 
 32. A swap is an agreement to exchange cash flows in the future. HULL, supra note 11, at 1. 
For more discussion of structured instruments and pure derivatives, see id. at 125. 
 33. Id. at 637. 
 34. See generally GOODMAN, supra note 5. 
 35. Id. 
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by implementing production mechanisms that put no value on 
experience.36 The products and markets became more complex and 
specialized, and the costs calculated by companies regarding the 
resources required to manage and complete transactions focused only on 
a small subset of actual value. ―If we don‘t know how to measure it, or 
we haven‘t taken it into account in the past, then it doesn‘t exist‖ seemed 
to be the mantra of companies at the time.37 This attitude led to a general 
obliviousness to the high-risk nature of instruments based on subprime 
loans and a corresponding recklessness in trading such instruments. 
Furthermore, the lack of authority regulating the risk assessment 
capabilities of the back office has made it nearly impossible to track the 
irresponsibility of companies pursuing such high-risk transactions. 
1.  Collateralized debt obligations 
Although there are a variety of ways to categorize CDOs, for 
purposes of creating an audit trail there are three important questions to 
focus on: 
(1) Is the CDO ―funded‖ or ―unfunded‖? The distinction here is 
a combination of the way the deal is constructed and whether 
securities need to be issued or cash needs to be invested for 
the CDO to be traded.38 
(2) Is the CDO a ―synthetic‖ or ―hybrid‖ structure? A standard 
CDO39 is where the tranches40 represent actual underlying 
ABS instruments.41 A synthetic CDO is where some or all of 
the tranches consist of packages of CDSs that are designed 
to emulate the cash flows that would result from the selected 
underlying instruments instead of acquiring the ABS 
instruments that actually do produce the cash flows (this 
usually creates basis risk).42 
(3) Is the CDO actively or passively managed? If the fund 
manager is able to trade other products to maintain the asset 
base of the CDO, then there may be several areas where 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. HULL, supra note 11, at 646. 
 39. See id. 
 40. A tranche is one of a number of related securities offered as part of the same transaction. 
The word tranche is French for slice, section, series, or portion. In the financial sense of the word, 
each bond is a different slice of the deal's risk. Transaction documentation usually defines the 
tranches as different classes of notes. See DWIGHT, supra note 2, at 6. 
 41. HULL, supra note 11, at 646. 
 42. Id. 
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certain risks are introduced that are hard to measure or even 
to detect.43 
Such complexities require extensive documentation in order to detect 
possible risks and assess them properly. Without this documentation it 
would be impossible for the financial institution to know if it were 
making a deal likely to leave nothing but toxic assets in the portfolio.44 
Once the deal has proven financially detrimental to the parties involved, 
it is increasingly difficult for federal regulators to determine where things 
went wrong, or to allocate responsibility for the situation, unless 
documentation is available to identify the original agreement. 
2.  Credit default swaps 
Credit default swaps are bilateral contracts entered into to insure 
against the default of a particular company.45 Originally created as a 
method for banks to mitigate their risks on loans and bonds,46 CDSs 
have become the primary instrument used in the Credit Risk Markets.47 
They comprise roughly 95% of the currently estimated credit derivatives 
transactions and have served as the primary disease vector to spread 
interlocking risks globally.48 Other products in these markets include 
total return swaps and total asset swaps. 
  
 
 43. Id. 
 44. See generally GOODMAN, supra note 5. 
 45. CHENG, supra note 12, at 5. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Antoine Bouveret, The Credit Default Swap (CDS) Market, 52 TRÉSOR-ECONOMICS 
1, 2 (Feb. 2009). 
Diagram 1 
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In a traditional CDS arrangement, it is entirely optional for either 
party to have an ownership interest in the underlying reference entity. 
(See Diagram 1, illustrating the relationships in a CDS.)49 This option is 
a critical factor in the growth of the market and in some of the more 
negative aspects of CDSs combined with other instruments, particluarly 
CDOs. In options markets, writing (i.e., selling) a put option on a 
security one does not own is referred to as a ―naked put.‖50 A firm 
selling a CDS that does not own the reference obligation is essentially 
writing a naked put. Also, it is important to note that the reference entity 
has no voice in the transaction—neither the buyer nor the seller is 
obligated to report to anyone else that they have entered into the swap 
agreement. A useful analogy is car insurance—not only can one buy 
insurance for his own car, but so can hundreds of other people. The 
insurance company will collect premiums from everyone who buys a 
policy, but if the original owner drives his car into a ditch, the insurance 
company will have to pay everyone who has purchased insurance on that 
individual‘s car.51 
Reference entities and obligations are typically sovereign or 
corporate debt or, starting in roughly 2002, tranches of structured 
securities.52 Default events are either ―hard‖ or ―soft,‖ depending on 
whether the terms of the deal allow, for example, a missed payment to be 
made up in future installments.53 The soft defaults and the customization 
with which they were created are a significant factor in the 
recordkeeping nightmare into which the CDS transactions have 
evolved.54 
A key attribute of a CDS is the difficulty of getting out of it—there is 
no standard way to ―tear up‖ a contract. The lack of a standardized 
termination method led many parties to write another CDS with a third 
party that would offset the risk of the original contract, thereby adding 
another instance of counterparty risk. Additionally, the process of 
―novation‖  (i.e., a somewhat controlled re-assignment of deals) created a 
significant mess in the recordkeeping and lifecycle management 
processes related to CDS deals. 
 
 49. Diagram created by Bill Nichols based on discussions with industry participants. 
 50. See generally HULL, supra note 11. 
 51. Interview with Jim Northey, FIX/LaSalle Technology Group. 
 52. See generally David Mengle, Credit Derivative: An Overview, 92 ECON. REV. 4 (2007). 
 53. See generally International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) Home Page, 
http://www.isda.org. The ISDA documentation covers six types of Default Events. 
 54. Id. 
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B. Subprime Synthetic/Hybrid CDOs—The Toxic Disease Vector 
The intersection of the CDO and CDS markets was central in the 
market meltdown. Synthetic and hybrid CDOs created using CDSs to 
emulate subprime ABS tranches and cash flow in turn created multi-
layered relationships. Because multiple players in the CDS market had 
offsetting positions, the chain of relationships was tightly coupled and 
cascaded out to other parts of the market faster than participants could 
track or measure.55 Poor documentation of the increasingly complex web 
resulted in trades based on incorrectly calculated valuations of 
instruments. When these instruments mature or a default is triggered, 
there is a great difference between the money available and how much 
was expected or even guaranteed due to the improper valuations used.56 
Without the documentation and a regulating authority to review it, there 
is no recourse for those injured by the recklessness of financial 
institutions that misrepresent what they trade and ultimately sell what 
they do not own. 
IV. THE SUPPLY CHAIN: FOLLOW THE MONEY 
With a foundational understanding of the factors leading to the 
current crisis, one can examine a specific set of CDOs—securities built 
from subprime ABSs with underlying vintages of 2005, 2006, and 2007. 
Analyzing the supply chain in both directions (from origination to 
purchase), greatly helps one to understand exactly where the assets and 
obligations lie in the marketplace. 
A modern market economy is organized around moving money 
either in the present (making payments and borrowing money for a very 
short period of time) or in the future (borrowing money for longer 
periods or investing in some form of asset). The payment mechanisms 
and short-term lending functions form the essential basis for the 
operations of all members of the larger economy and are here referred to 
simply as ―banking.‖ The investments and insurance sub-sectors of the 
financial services industry are more complex and differentiated. The 
focus here is primarily on the sub-sector of the investment groups that 
engage in capital market activities—the creation and trading of 
securities. All gateways to the investments group go through some type 
of banking layer. In the United States, this path consists of a finite 
 
 55. Ingo Fender & Janet Mitchell, Structured Finance: Complexity, Risk and the Use of 
Ratings, BIS Q. REV. 67, 69–70 (June 2005). 
 56. Id. 
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number of firms, an extremely simple group to identify.57 As discussed 
below, many participants play multiple roles. And that is only the 
beginning. 
A. The Processes and Players 
The overall process of creating and selling new financial instruments 
consists of two relatively discrete steps. The first step is loan origination 
and underwriting. Loan origination is the process by which loans 
originate. Underwriting is the process of bringing securities to market; an 
initial public offering in the stock market is typically underwritten by 
consortium of investment banks, known as a syndicate.58 Specific 
mechanisms vary across asset classes and by original source of funds. In 
the case of subprime mortgages, the original securities were not designed 
to be traded in the secondary markets and required further modification 
into structured ABS pools (with their associated CDOs) to make them 
tradable assets.59 The second step is structuring and packaging. 
Structuring refers to the legal, financial, and operational business 
processes required to acquire and create pooled securities.60 Packaging 
refers to the marketing, sales, distribution, and lifecycle management 
pieces required to solicit buyers for new securities.61 
Once securities have been sold to the initial investors, they become 
available in secondary markets. In these secondary markets, ownership 
of the actual securities can change and  other market participants—not 
necessarily owners of the new securities—can use derivative instruments 
to make trades reflecting their view of the securities‘ value.62 The 
creation of these new financial instruments relative to subprime 
mortgages for the secondary markets brings its own complexities into the 
equation. 
B. Special Purpose Vehicles 
Special purpose vehicles (SPVs) are the means by which subprime 
asset-backed securities in their new securitized form are sold into the 
 
 57. Philip Arestis & Elias Karakitsos, Subprime Mortgage Market and Current Financial 
Crisis, CAMBRIDGE CENTER FOR ECON. & PUB. POL‘Y 1, 7–9 (2009). 
 58. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(A)(11) (2009); see, e.g., United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Form S-1, Registration Statement, Visa Inc. (Nov. 9, 2007). 
 59. Asset-Backed Securities, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8518; 34-509405 (Mar. 8, 2005), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8518.htm [hereinafter SEC]. 
 60. See generally Heavenrich & Company, Inc.,  http://www.heavenrich.com/structuring.html 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2009). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See generally SEC, supra note 59. 
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market.63 SPVs are a core piece of the structured finance ecosystem. The 
specific parties involved in SPVs are important links in the chain to 
―Follow the Money.‖64 (See Diagram 2 for a generic view of 
relationships and players involved in a typical deal.)65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One can follow the money trail with the originators of the loans used 
 
 63. The SPV has specific legal, accounting, governance, and operational processes, and there 
are several different versions of these structures, due mainly to different rules for manufacturers 
depending on their position in the supply chain and relationship to the core underlying instruments. 
Here we‘ll use the term SPV generically to include all these variations. 
 64. Fender & Mitchell, supra note 55, at 67, 70. 
 65. Committee on the Global Financial System, The Role of Ratings in Structured Finance: 
Issues and Implications, BIS Q. REV. 6 (Jan. 2005). 
Diagram 2 
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to create asset-backed securities. For subprime mortgages, independent 
loan brokers originated the loans and sold the mortgages, at closing, to 
mortgage loan companies, such as Countrywide Financial.66 
Countrywide (or similar loan companies) would then sell the loan to 
banks, investment banks, or brokerage firms, like Citigroup, Inc. or 
Merrill Lynch.67 The banks or firms then packaged pools of these loans 
(typically with common characteristics such as interest rate or maturity) 
into asset-backed securities. These asset-backed securities would in turn 
be sold to institutional investors such as hedge funds, insurance 
companies, pension funds and mutual funds.68 
C. Unraveling the Documentation 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires 
registration of each pool of asset-backed securities. Typically banks or 
firms use their own in-house counsel or hire outside attorneys to prepare 
and file paperwork with the SEC. In addition, they often hire 
independent accountants to review their books in accordance with SEC 
requirements.69 It appears, however, a significant amount of data was 
unrecorded with respect to the asset-backed transactions, especially 
because certain filings were optional.70 Actual completeness and 
accuracy of filings related to securitized structures varied widely.71 Thus, 
a systematic assessment of these records is essential in unraveling what 
went wrong and developing a way to prevent such problems in the 
future. 
Simply stated, lack of supervision in the securities trading market 
made an economic crisis both possible and probable. Society has been 
warned previously that financial supervision should keep up with 
financial innovation.72 In keeping with that spirit, before the crisis, a 
 
 66. Countrywide Financial was a former independent mortgage lender which has since been 
incorporated into Bank of America. See Zac Bissonnette, Bank of America Ditches Countrywide 
Name, BloggingStocks, 19 Feb. 2009, http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2009/02/19/bank-of-america-
ditches-countrywide-name/. 
 67. By 2006, nearly every major investment bank or bank had purchased a non-bank 
specializing in subprime mortgage loans and set up a ―warehouse‖ program to accumulate loans for 
repackaging, making their ties to the industry even closerand, of course, increasing the demand for 
new loans. 
 68. Paul Muolo & Mathew Padilla, Chain of Blame: How Wall Street Caused the Mortgage 
and Credit Crisis 221-222 (Wiley & Sons 2008). 
 69. See generally SEC, supra note 59. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction-Structured Finance and Credit Market Reform 
in the Bubble Era, 5 Hastings Bus. L.J. 53, 57–59 (2009). 
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multiple-authority supervision regime was in place that involved both 
state and federal regulation and multiple departments, including the 
Federal Reserve Bank, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the 
Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
and the SEC. This regime may have reflected the spirit of checks and 
balances, as then Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan 
successfully argued ―the absence of the dual system could actually hurt 
consumers and the economy.‖73 However, with economic globalization 
and rapid advancement of financial institutions, this multiple-authority 
supervision regime created regulatory gaps resulting in unsupervised 
high-risk derivatives.74 
The most obvious of these gaps is the non-conforming regulatory 
criteria. For example, while regular reporting of distributions from 
structured investment vehicles can be found in documents filed with the 
SEC, it is difficult to find internal company documentation of settled 
transactions in CDSs.75 Trades in CDSs were done by teams on the CDS 
desks of the investment banks; however, trades which were transacted 
over the phone or via text messages were rarely cleared or settled in a 
timely fashion by the banks‘ back office operations.76 In 2005, the 
Federal Reserve uncovered a three-month delay in over 70% of the CDS 
transactions on the Street.77 Little investment in back office technology 
and a lack of communication with the front offices hindered efficient 
operations with regard to these securities.78 As there are no specific 
guidelines regarding responsibility for the regulation of CDSs or CDOs, 
no one regulatory body claims responsibility for overseeing trading of 
these high-risk derivatives. 
In the chaotic and unregulated ABS/CDO/CDS market of 2005–
2007, it is now apparent that little effort was made to carefully evaluate 
the risk of the investments made by those buying and selling these 
products. This combination of gaps and irregularities contributed in a 
myriad of ways to the meltdown of the credit markets.79 However, 
another important issue is the lack of timely documentation and 
 
 73. BNA Banking Report, Mar. 7, 1994 (arguing that having no alternatives in financial 
regulation can hurt financial consumers and the economy). 
 74. David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape, 14 
Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 709, 732 (2009). 
 75. See generally SEC, supra note 59. 
 76. Timothy F. Geithner, Remarks at the Bond Market Association‘s Annual Meeting in New  
York City (Apr. 20, 2005), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches_archive/2005/gei050420.html. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See generally SEC, supra note 59. 
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recordkeeping in this unregulated market, especially with respect to 
CDSs.80 Trading new, evolving, and highly complex instruments with 
undocumented (or unknown) lifecycle requirements coupled with a 
chronic lack of investment in operations is hardly a novel recipe for 
trouble.81 However, the historical tendency of the front office and senior 
management to regard operations as a ―necessary evil‖ to be funded at 
minimal levels does not, by itself, explain what happened.82 
D. The Toxic Assets Web 
Unwinding the threads from subprime mortgages to the ABSs 
containing these mortgages, the packaging of CDOs from the same 
underlying subprime assets, and CDS transactions based on the subprime 
securities (but not requiring the underlying asset) essentially reveals the 
same players creating, selling, and buying securities. (See Diagram 3.)83 
In this process, the initial one dollar loan was magnified to five dollars or 
even fifty dollars worth of financial derivatives. Each step lengthened the 
financial chain, until finally, no one cared about the basic value of the 
financial products, leading the market to solve the problem with the fruits 
of short-term speculation. The creation of a CDO required the bundling 
of existing ABSs and other assets into a single securitized loan with 
differing tranches.84 Bankers and lawyers created the security, traders 
and sales people in investment banks sold pieces of the loan, and the 
same parties who had purchased the original ABSs were often the same 
hedge funds, insurance companies, and pension funds who purchased 
these derivative securities.85 In the same way, CDS sales and trading 
were typically done among the same cast of characters, with the traders 
once again making money for their investment bank, hedge fund, or bank 
with each trade.86 The investment banks made money with every trade, 
from the bottom of the structure to the top.87 
 
 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Geithner, supra note 77. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Diagram conceived and created by Bill Nichols. See Muolo & Padilla, supra note 68, at 
220. 
 84. Id. at 221. 
 85. Id. at 115, 221. 
 86. Id. at 115. 
 87. Id. at 220; Gretchen Morgenson, How the Thundering Herd Faltered and Fell, 
N.Y.TIMES,Nov.08,2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/business/09magic.html?_r=1&8dpc=&_r. 
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Diagram 3 
E. The “Magic Happens Here”: The Way to Make Something Toxic 
Smell Clean 
When U.S. housing price appreciation began to slow in 2007, the 
investment banks traded CDOs based on subprime ABSs that went from 
reasonably risky but high yielding instruments (that one theoretically 
could pass off to other investors) to toxic assets almost overnight.88 This 
change was due in significant part to a combination of poor modeling 
assumptions (e.g., ―house prices never go down‖) and related inflated 
credit ratings applied to structured ABS tranches when they were 
wrapped inside the CDO envelope and augmented with various forms of 
credit enhancement.89 In a process that now looks to be a tragic 
combination of magic and wishful thinking, some of these tranches 
somehow ended up with AAA investment ratings and were marketed as 
high quality investments, which dramatically broadened the base of 
potential investors to include pension funds and asset managers. (See 
Diagram 4.)90 
 
 
 
 88. GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 298. 
 89. Id. at 128–29. 
 90. Diagram created by Bill Nichols based on discussions with industry participants. See 
SEC, supra note 59; GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 316; Mengle, supra note 52, at 8–9. 
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Diagram 4 
 
 
Looking back, in the wake of the creative ratings of the CDOs, a 
more active public sector involvement should now be emphasized. Not 
only should the short-term issues be fixed, but also a sounder financial 
system must be established to serve our long-term goal of a stable 
financial market. 
V. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
In order to create a more sound financial system, a conceptual audit 
trail of the toxic assets borne from the subprime mortgage market should 
be established. Such an audit trail can be created by simply identifying 
the inputs and their corresponding instruments in the assets. Although 
difficult, it is a task that can be done. Given the evolution of 
technological tools, much of the standard software used to manage global 
data flows for business in financial recordkeeping could be used to 
achieve this goal. 
As discussed above, the core arena for the market meltdown was the 
intersection of the markets for CDOs and related CDSs. Fewer than fifty 
firms globally were at the nexus where SPVs were spun out of banks and 
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used to create subprime ABS CDOs,91 which makes a central repository 
of these transactions very manageable. Starting with known loans with 
poor vintages (post-June 2005) and working out the (at times theoretical) 
money and contract flows structurally through the securities markets 
would be the starting point to reconstruct and find the errors in the 
system. Once the data is collected from the various parties, regulators, 
financial institutions, and investors should be better able to understand 
the combination of factors that permitted the toxic asset ―house of cards‖ 
to be assembled. This will hopefully encourage financial institutions to 
invest more heavily in their back office to avoid the prevalence of toxic 
assets in their portfolio. A stronger back office would mean more 
accurate valuation of securitized assets and a clearer paper trail. This 
should make institutions more accountable to regulating authorities, 
more responsible to their customers, and better overall shepherds to their 
shareholders‘ investments. 
Ideally, a policy would be implemented to augment the motivation to 
continue the data collection in these products and to fill in the gaps 
through which certain instruments have squeezed. In tandem with 
institutional measures, the government‘s policy of providing 
transparency in our financial markets92 should make such a data 
warehouse for financial instruments and market participants a critical 
piece in rebuilding our financial infrastructure. While the costs of this 
effort are not trivial, many times the amount of money required for this 
task has been handed to market participants responsible for creating 
much of the crisis, with little discernible result. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Unlike with past systemic market breakdowns, the technology and 
ability needed to analyze precisely what happened in the current market 
meltdown exists today. In the process, one can gain the knowledge 
needed to craft future regulatory and governance approaches that 
consider the collective set of facts that led to the current credit crisis. On 
October 23, 2008, former Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Alan 
Greenspan testified before the Committee of Government Oversight and 
Reform, stating that he had made a ―mistake‖ in believing that banks, 
operating in their own self-interest, would do what was necessary to 
protect their shareholders and institutions.93 He called it ―a ‗flaw‘ in the 
 
 91. BARTH, supra note 1, at 29. 
 92. BARTH, supra note 1, at 37–38. 
 93. See Brian Knowlton & Michael M. Grynbaum, Greenspan ―Shocked‖ that Free Markets 
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free market theory.‖94 Creating a central repository of transactional 
history and a government authority to both regulate it and guide financial 
institutions to be more responsible (while allowing them to retain self-
interest as the motive) is necessary to fix that flaw. The ―what‖ and 
―how‖ of the contents to be regulated will be uncovered as one learns 
from the past market collapse and works through the flawed structures 
and processes that created that collapse. However, time is of the essence. 
Each day new transactions further obscure the record, lessening our 
chances of stopping this market crisis from reoccurring. 
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